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Abstract 
Conventional practice is to draw inferences from all available data and research 
results, even though there is ample evidence to suggest that empirical literatures 
suffer from publication selection bias. When a scientific literature is plagued by 
such bias, a simple discarding of the vast majority of empirical results can actually 
improve statistical inference and estimation.  Simulations demonstrate that, if the 
majority of  researchers, reviewers, and editors use statistical significance as a 
criterion for reporting or publishing an estimate, discarding 90% of the published 
findings greatly reduces publication selection bias and is often more efficient than 
conventional summary statistics.  Improving statistical estimation and inference 
through removing so much data goes against statistical theory and practice; hence, it 
is paradoxical. We investigate a very simple method to reduce the effects of 
publication bias and to improve the efficiency of summary estimates of 
accumulated empirical research results that averages the most precise ten percent of 
the reported estimates (i.e., ‘Top10’). In the process, the critical importance of 
precision (the inverse of an estimate’s standard error) as a measure of a study’s 
quality is brought to light. Reviewers and journal editors should use precision as 
one objective measure of a study’s quality. 
Key Words: Publication Selection, Meta-analysis, Precision, Simulations, Meta-
Regression. 
 
Stanley: Department of Economics, Hendrix College, 1600 Washington St., Conway, AR, 72032, 
USA. Email: Stanley@hendrix.edu. Phone: 501-450-1276. 
 
Jarrell: Department of Global Management and Strategy, College of Business, Western Carolina 
University, Cullowhee, NC 28723.  Email: jarrell@email.wcu.edu.  Phone: 828-631-1420. 
 
Doucouliagos:  School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 221 Burwood 
Highway, Burwood, 3125, Victoria, Australia. Email: douc@deakin.edu.au. Phone: 61 03 9244 
6531. Could It Be Better to Discard 90% of the Data? 
1. Introduction 
 
Fundamental statistical criteria such as efficiency and power are fueled by data.  To 
statisticians, data are sacrosanct.  ‘The more data the better’ is the statistician’s 
motto.  Only under extreme conditions, termed ‘outliers,’ can a researcher be 
justified in ignoring or discarding the data.  Even then, the removed data must be 
suspected to be in error: miscoded, mistakenly measured, or somehow gathered 
from an entirely different population.  If such a principle of inclusion applies to 
data, in general, would it not also be applicable to the contents of the studies 
published in our most prestigious scientific journals?   
  This paper identifies a common condition in social science and medical 
research where it may be better to discard ninety percent of the reported empirical 
estimates, routinely.  When is it better to discard 90% of the data?  If the majority of 
the researchers, reviewers, and editors use statistical significance as a criterion for 
reporting or publishing an estimate, statistical inference and estimation may 
improve by completely ignoring the vast majority of the reported research.  When 
reported estimates are selected for their statistical significance, valid empirical 
inference is threatened because the research base will contain large publication 
selection biases.   
  Publication selection bias has long been acknowledged as a severe threat to 
statistical inference and scientific practice (Sterling, 1959; Tullock, 1959; Feige, 
1975; Rosenthal, 1979; Glass, McGaw and Smith, 1981; Lovell, 1983; Hedges and 
Oklin, 1985; Begg and Berlin, 1988; DeLong and Lang, 1992; Card and Krueger, 
1995; Sterling, Rosenbaum and Weinkam, 1995; and Copas, 1999, to mention a 
few). When the majority of reported findings are selected for statistical significance, 
empirical phenomena can be manufactured, mere artifacts of the publication 
selection process.  For example, the efficacy of a new pharmacological treatment or 
the adverse employment effect of raising the minimum wage may be seen by many 
researchers as established fact, when the effect is nothing more than the result of 
publication selection bias (Krakovsky, 2004; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).  In 
the social sciences, the overreliance and abuse of statistical significance has caused 
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a longstanding controversy and a revision of the American Psychological 
Association editorial policy (Carver 1978; Cohen, 1994; Harlow et al. 1997; Daniel, 
1998; and APA, 1994).  By examining 65 separate meta-analyses of separate areas 
of economics research, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2008) document how 
publication selection is a serious issue in two-thirds of empirical economics.   
Sterling, Rosenbaum and Weinkam (1995) show how selection for significance is 
also a widespread practice in the natural sciences. Gerber, Green and Nickerson 
(2001) and Gerber and Malhorta (2008) show the same in political science.  A 
recent systematic review found evidence that publication selection is widespread in 
medical research (Hopewell et al., 2009).  Due to the widely recognized adverse 
effects of publication selection bias, all the best medical journals now require the 
prior registration of clinical trials (Krakovsky, 2004).  
  The purpose of this paper is to document this statistical paradox that 
discarding 90% of the data might actually improve scientific inference. To reduce 
publication selection bias, we offer a very simple, ‘back-of-an-envelope’ remedy, 
the ‘top 10 percent.’ The performance of the average of the most precise ten percent 
of the reported estimates (i.e., ‘Top10’) is simulated and compared to alternative 
conventional summary statistics that use all the reported research results.  In some 
realistic circumstances, the Top10 can greatly reduce bias and is more efficient than 
conventional summary estimators.  Recall that precision is the inverse of the 
estimate’s standard error, or 1/SEi.  We do not wish to supplant existing corrections 
for publication selection such as: trim and fill, funnel-asymmetry and precision-
effect meta-regression analysis, Heckman meta-regression or maximum likelihood 
selection models (Duval and Tweedie, 2000; Stanley, 2005; Stanley, 2008; Moreno 
et al., 2009; Hedges, 1997).  Rather, we use this paradox and its simple remedy to 
highlight the widespread vulnerability of the empirical sciences to publication 
selection.  In the process, we underscore the critical importance of the oft neglected 
statistical dimension, precision, in improving scientific inference.  
 
2. Funnel Graphs and Precision  
“The simplest and most commonly used method to detect publication bias is an informal 
examination of a funnel plot.”        – Sutton et al. (2000, p.1574) 
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2.1 Funnel Graphs and Publication Selection 
Funnel graphs have been widely used in medical research and the social 
sciences to identify publication selection.  A funnel graph is a scatter diagram of a 
reported empirical estimate (ei) and its precision (i.e., the inverse of the estimate’s 
standard error, or 1/SEi). As its name suggests, a funnel plot should resemble an 
inverted funnel (see Figure 1).  As the estimates become more precise (i.e., moving 
from the bottom to the top of the diagram), the reported estimates become less 
spread out and tend to converge to the ‘true’ value. In the absence of publication 
selection (or selection for statistical significance), the plot will be symmetric—see 
Figure 1.   
{Insert Figure 1 about there} 
 
The idea that symmetry is implied by the absence of publication selection 
assumes, of course, that there is only one underlying population from which each 
estimate is drawn (i.e., homogeneity).  In many areas of empirical research, this 
assumption will not be valid, and multivariate meta-regression analysis will be 
required.  Multivariate meta-regression is routinely employed in economics to 
explain the widely observed, systematic heterogeneity among reported empirical 
estimates.  A funnel graph can also be used to identify when heterogeneity is 
required to be addressed explicitly. If the funnel graph has no single peak, no single 
parameter will adequately summarize this area of research, and heterogeneity will 
need to be explicitly modeled. 
{Insert Figure 2 about there} 
 
Publication selection for a specific directional effect (whether positive or 
negative) will skew the reported results and make the funnel graph asymmetric.  
Asymmetry is the hallmark of publication selection (Sutton et al., 2000), and it is 
routinely observed in the majority of areas of economic research (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2008).  See Figures 2, 3 and 4 for several examples.   If the funnel 
graph is ‘inverted’ by placing SEi on the vertical axis and then the axes are 
reversed, the funnel graph can be fitted by meta-regression analysis (MRA) (Card 
and Kreuger, 1995; Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2005; Stanley, 2008): 
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  e i = βe + βSE SEi + εi        ;    i=1, 2, … L                (1) 
   
where i is an index that denotes a given study’s reported estimate in a research 
literature comprised of L studies.   
  Equation (1) will contain obvious heteroscedasticty; thus, weighted least 
squares (WLS) are almost always employed when this MRA model is estimated.  
The WLS meta-regression model (1) may be expressed as a regression of a study’s 
reported t-values (ti) on precision (1/SEi).   
 
ti = βSE + βe (1/SEi) + νi                    (2) 
 
(Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2008).  Testing whether βSE=0 provides an objective 
test for the funnel asymmetry and therefore for the presence of publication bias.  
Simulations show that this funnel-asymmetry test (FAT) is valid, although it has 
low power in identifying publication selection (Stanley, 2008).  
 Testing  H0: βe =0 serves as a powerful test of whether there is a genuine 
empirical effect beyond publication selection (Stanley, 2008).  Medical researchers 
use the estimate of βe in (2) as a corrected empirical effect (Sutton et al., 2000; 
Moreno et al., 2009).  However, this estimate is known to be biased downward 
when there is a genuine nonzero effect (Stanley, 2008). 
 
{Insert Figure 3 about there} 
{Insert Figure 4 about there} 
 
  
The bias induced by publication selection often exceeds the magnitude of the 
underlying phenomenon being estimated (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2008; 
Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).  Typical funnel graphs for a given area of 
empirical research are skewed, often highly so, as Figures 2, 3 and 4 show.  The 
real problem for empirical science is that conventional summary statistics can be 
greatly distorted.  For example, the rates of smoking cessation from nicotine 
replacement therapy (NRT) are highly skewed (Figure 2), and the beneficial effect 
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of this therapy is greatly diminished once one accounts for publication selection 
(see the next section).   
In the case of the employment effect of minimum-wage raises (Figure 3), the 
average reported elasticity is -0.19, which is statistically quite significant and 
widely regarded by economists to be an important adverse effect.  Elasticity is the 
standard way economists measure the effect of one variable on another, controlling 
for all other factors.  This average elasticity estimates the percent decrease in 
employment (about 0.2%) that would result from a one percent increase in the 
minimum wage.  However, once publication selection is accounted for, little or no 
evidence of any adverse employment effect remains (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 
2009).   
For the effect of adopting a common currency (e.g., the Euro) on the flow of 
trade, the average reported gamma, which is the regression coefficient from a 
logarithmic relation, is 0.859 and implies that a 136% increase in trade would result 
from joining a currency union—see Figure 4.  This is almost universally regarded 
as a very large and practically important effect.  Needless to say, it is also very 
statistically significant using conventional summary statistics.  However, judging by 
the top of the graph (Figure 4), it is not at all clear that there is much, if any, trade 
effect from adopting a common currency. 
 
2.2 On the Importance of Being Precise 
Note how the tops of the funnel graphs are more tightly distributed and less 
skewed.  These more precise estimates may still be biased, in the case of Figures 2, 
3 and 4, but the bias will be of a much smaller magnitude.  Not only are precise 
estimates more reliable and more efficient, they also have a smaller bias when the 
results are selected for their statistical significance.  If there is a small empirical 
effect but the estimate’s standard error is much smaller still, there will be virtually 
no need for selection and practically no bias.  Even when the true effect is zero, the 
selection for the significance of very precise estimates will induce only a small bias.  
The point to these obvious observations is that precision is a key dimension of 
publication selection and its bias.  Thus, the top of a funnel graph deserves special 
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attention and greater weight.  Reviewers and journal editors should use precision as 
one objective measure of a study’s quality.    
  Meta-analysts have long recognized the role that precision can play in 
summarizing an area of research and in handling publication selection bias, recall 
equation (2) (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2008).  The MRA test, H0: βe=0, for the 
presence of an empirical effect beyond publication bias has been called the 
precision-effect test (PET), because it is the MRA regression coefficient on 
precision (Stanley, 2008).  When applied to NRT clinical trials, PET provides 
borderline evidence of a genuine positive effect of using the patch for smoking 
cessation.  Uncorrected, the average risk ratio for NRT is 1.93; that is, the 
experimental group had a 93% higher smoking cessation rate than the control 
group, on average. However, PET is only marginally significant (t=2.00; p=.053).  
Although one might be tempted to use the fact that there are only 42 controlled 
studies that use the patch as NRT to explain this marginal result, this precision-
effect test (H0:  βe =0) has been found to be powerful even in smaller samples 
(Stanley, 2008).  In contrast, there is no ambiguity about the presence of publication 
selection.  The funnel-asymmetry test (H0: βSE=0) shows clear signs of selection 
bias (t=3.02; p<.01).  Unlike the precision-effect test, this test (FAT) is known to 
have low power (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2008) and yet there is clear evidence 
of publication selection.  All three research areas displayed in funnel graphs 2, 3, 
and 4 contain clear evidence of asymmetry and hence publication selection.   
Meta-analysts also exploit precision in the conventional summary weighted 
averages called ‘fixed- and random-effect’ estimators (FEE and REE, respectively).  
FEE weights each reported estimate by the inverse of the square of its standard 
error—or its precision squared.  Weighting by the precision squared has been 
shown to be efficient (Cooper and Hedges, 1994).  FEE assumes that all of the 
reported estimates are drawn from the same population with a common mean.   
When estimates are drawn from several populations (i.e., when there is 
heterogeneity), REE becomes the appropriate estimator.  It weights each estimate 







 is an estimate of the between-study or heterogeneity variance.   
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Because both of these summary statistics give greater weight to more precise 
estimates, they are less biased than the simple mean when there is publication 
selection.  Clearly, precision is the key to a less biased and more efficient summary 
of empirical research when results are selected, in part, for statistical significance. 
 
2.3 Top10 
What if the most precise estimates were given even greater weight?  Wouldn’t 
this reduce the effects of publication bias further?  Taken to the extreme, we might 
give the most precise (say the most precise ten percent of the reported estimates) a 
weight of one and the remainder a weight of zero.  Obviously, this is a radical 
proposal, one that goes against much statistical theory and practice.   However, this 
Top10  estimator can be shown to be less biased and more efficient than 
conventional summary estimators under conditions found in many areas of 
scientific research.  We do not wish to imply that this naïve approach contains the 
most efficient set of weights for the reported empirical findings.  The most efficient 
estimator would depend, among other things, on the proportion of scientific 
findings that are selected for their statistical significance.  Unfortunately, this 
incidence of publication selection is inherently unobservable; thus, identifying the 
most efficient set of weights would be a difficult problem that serves little practical 
purpose.  We chose the top 10% because it is less biased than larger percents (e.g., 
the top 20%).  However, as the chosen percentage decreases, the mean of the 
remaining few will be less and less efficient. The choice of the top percentage will 
remain somewhat arbitrary because its efficacy will ultimately depend, among other 




The design used in these simulations is the same as that employed in Stanley 
(2008) to investigate the small-sample properties of testing the MRA parameters in 
equation (2) against zero.  Random data are generated, and a regression coefficient 
is estimated and tested against zero (i.e., H0: β=0).  Heterogeneity variation and 
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regression residuals are drawn from independent, normal distributions.  Regression 
is chosen because it is a dominant statistical technique used in several social 
sciences and may be regarded as encompassing other widely applied techniques 
(e.g, ANOVA and t-tests) (Moore, 1997).     
Publication bias is simulated as selecting a statistically significant positive 
regression coefficient.  That is, if a random estimate does not provide a significantly 
positive t-value, a new sample is taken and the original regression is run again with 
different random errors and heterogeneity until a significant t-value is obtained by 
chance. For example, the 50% publication selection condition assumes that exactly 
half of the studies estimate and re-estimate their regression models until a random, 
yet significantly positive, estimate is found and reported.  For the other half, the 
first random estimate, significant or not, is reported and used.  In practice, not all 
published results will have been selected for statistical significance.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that the incidence of publication selection is either: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% 
or 100%.   
The sample sizes used are 40 and 80.  Many areas of economics research report 
more estimates, often many times more. The smaller sample size is chosen to be 
more consistent with medical research. In particular, there are 42 clinical trials of 
the effect on smoking cessation from nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) using the 
patch (n=42).  When all nicotine delivery methods are combined, there are more 
than 100 clinical trials (n=112) (Stead et al., 2008).  Changing the sample size has 
little effect on the bias or the relative performance of these estimators.  Of course, 
reducing the sample size will increase the mean square errors of all estimators, 
especially the Top10.  Throwing out 90% of the data is especially imprudent when 
the number of estimates available in a research literature is small. 
Along with the incidence of publication selection, publication bias is most 
highly influenced by the magnitude of the unexplained heterogeneity relative to 
sampling error (σε





2) is a 
widely employed indicator of the magnitude of heterogeneity (Higgins and 
Thompson, 2002).  It may be interpreted as the proportion of the observed variance 
(σh
2+σε
2) that is due to heterogeneity across studies (σh
2).  Tables 1 and 2 report this 
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heterogeneity proportion, I
2
, as well as the incidence of publication selection for a 
wide variety of Monte Carlo experiments.  I
2 
is controlled by changing the between-
study variance.  It is calculated from the population parameters when there is no 
publication selection.  Sample estimates of I
2
 will vary as a function of selection 
and the existence of a true empirical effect. 
 









FEE REE  Top10 
e β ˆ  
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.23 0.20 0.22  0.13  0.04 
  0  50%  0.47 0.39 0.43  0.28  0.06 
  0  75%  0.70 0.59 0.63  0.41  0.07 
I
2=25%  0  100%  0.93 0.78 0.78  0.55  0.07 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.07 1.04 1.04  1.00  0.92 
  1  50%  1.13 1.08 1.09  1.01  0.85 
  1  75%  1.20 1.11 1.13  1.02  0.77 
  1  100%  1.26 1.15 1.16  1.02  0.68 
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.27 0.23 0.25  0.14  0.04 
  0  50%  0.54 0.45 0.51  0.30  0.08 
  0  75%  0.81 0.68 0.75  0.47  0.14 
I
2=58%  0  100%  1.08 0.91 0.92  0.66  0.20 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.10 1.07 1.08  1.02  0.94 
  1  50%  1.19 1.13 1.16  1.04  0.88 
  1  75%  1.29 1.19 1.23  1.07  0.81 
  1  100%  1.39 1.26 1.30  1.08  0.74 
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.36 0.29 0.34  0.18  0.04 
  0  50%  0.72 0.58 0.68  0.38  0.10 
  0  75%  1.09 0.88 1.02  0.62  0.22 
I
2=85%  0  100%  1.45 1.20 1.29  0.88  0.37 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.18 1.13 1.17  1.06  0.97 
  1  50%  1.36 1.27 1.33  1.12  0.93 
  1  75%  1.54 1.39 1.49  1.17  0.87 
  1  100%  1.73 1.52 1.63  1.22  0.80 





2). FEE & REE denote the fixed-effects and random-
effects estimators, respectively.   is estimated from equation 2.  e β ˆ
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the average values of alternative estimators observed over 
10,000 replications.  The true value of the underlying effect is either 0 or 1, as 
displayed in the tables.  Note how all of these conventional summary statistics, the 
simple mean and various weighted averages (including the Top10), are biased 
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upward when there is some publication selection (selection incidence >25%).  As 
expected, these biases will increase with the incidence of publication selection and 
the between-study heterogeneity. 
 









FEE REE  Top10 
e β ˆ  
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.23 0.20 0.22  0.14  0.04 
  0  50%  0.47 0.39 0.43  0.28  0.06 
  0  75%  0.70 0.59 0.63  0.41  0.07 
I
2=25%  0  100%  0.94 0.78 0.78  0.55  0.07 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.07 1.04 1.04  1.00  0.92 
  1  50%  1.13 1.08 1.09  1.01  0.85 
  1  75%  1.20 1.11 1.13  1.02  0.77 
  1  100%  1.26 1.15 1.16  1.03  0.69 
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.27 0.22 0.25  0.14  0.04 
  0  50%  0.54 0.45 0.51  0.30  0.09 
  0  75%  0.81 0.68 0.75  0.48  0.14 
I
2=58%  0  100%  1.08 0.91 0.92  0.66  0.20 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.10 1.07 1.08  1.02  0.95 
  1  50%  1.19 1.13 1.16  1.04  0.88 
  1  75%  1.29 1.19 1.23  1.06  0.81 
  1  100%  1.39 1.26 1.30  1.08  0.74 
  0  0%  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  25%  0.36 0.29 0.34  0.18  0.03 
  0  50%  0.72 0.58 0.68  0.39  0.11 
  0  75%  1.09 0.89 1.02  0.62  0.22 
I
2=85%  0  100%  1.45 1.20 1.29  0.89  0.38 
  1  0%  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  1  25%  1.18 1.13 1.17  1.06  0.97 
  1  50%  1.36 1.26 1.33  1.13  0.94 
  1  75%  1.55 1.39 1.49  1.18  0.88 
  1  100%  1.73 1.52 1.63  1.23  0.81 





2). FEE & REE denote the fixed-effects and random-
effects estimators, respectively.   is estimated from equation 2.  e β ˆ
 
Whenever there is publication selection, the Top10 has smaller bias than the 
conventional summary statistics, the simple mean and other weighted averages 
(FEE and REE), that use all the data.  In many cases, Top10 lowers the bias 
substantially even when compared to the weighted averages which give greater 
weight to the more precise estimates (FEE and REE).  When there is no publication 
selection, all estimators are virtually unbiased.  Thus, Tables 1 and 2 shows that 
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there is something to be said for discarding 90% of research when there is selection 
for statistical significance. 
 
Table 3: Mean Square Errors of Alternative Research Summary Estimators 









FEE REE  Top10 
e β ˆ  
  0  0%  3 3 3  14  27 
  0  25%  58 41 49  33  25 
  0  50%  221 155 186  88  22 
  0  75%  494 344 396  180  17 
I
2=25%  0  100%  875 603 603  310  10 
 1  0%  3 3 3  14  27 
 1  25%  7 4 5  13  30 
  1  50%  20 8 10  13  45 
  1  75%  41 15 18  13  74 
  1  100%  71 25 28  13  115 
  0  0%  6 6 6  27  51 
  0  25%  78 55 69  49  45 
  0  50%  295 207 260  115  43 
  0  75%  658 464 560  243  44 
I
2=58%  0 100%  1168  830  839  447  51 
 1  0%  6 6 5  27  50 
 1  25%  15 9 11  26  50 
  1  50%  42 22 30  25  56 
  1  75%  88 42 58  25  73 
 1  100%  152  70  92  26  99 
  0  0%  16 14 14  64  116 
 0  25%  145  94  129  97  104 
  0  50%  535 344 477  206  94 
 0  75%  1087  788  1040  422  108 
I
2=85%  0  100%  2100 1436 1674 792  172 
  1  0%  16 14 14  63  114 
  1  25%  46 30 39  59  101 
 1  50%  144  80  120  63  93 
  1  75%  305 161 245  71  88 
  1  100%  534 273 406  82  95 





2). FEE & REE denote the fixed-effects and random-
effects estimators, respectively.   is estimated from equation 2.  e β ˆ
 
Bias is one thing, but efficiency can be quite another.  Surely, discarding 90% of 
the data cannot be efficient.  Tables 3 and 4 report the mean squared errors (MSE) 
of these conventional summary statistics.  Surprisingly, the Top10 is also more 
efficient, as defined by smaller MSE, in many cases.  Essentially, as long as 50% or 
more of the studies use statistical significance as one criterion for reporting results, 
the  Top10 will have lower MSE than conventional summary statistics.  This is 
certainly the case when compared to the simple average, but FEE and/or REE may 
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have slightly smaller MSE than Top10 when the incidence of publication selection 
is exactly 50% and there is a genuine effect.  The relative performance of Top10 
depends on the amount of heterogeneity.  As heterogeneity increases, expected 
publication bias worsens; thus, the relative performance of the Top10 improves.  In 
over half the cases reported in Tables 3 and 4, the Top10 has the smallest MSE 
among all these averages, simple and weighted.  However, we are not trying to 
prove that Top10 is the best estimator, only that discarding 90% of the data may be 
a feasible strategy in some cases.   
 
Table 4: Mean Square Errors of Alternative Research Summary Estimators 









FEE REE  Top10 
e β ˆ  
  0  0%  7 6 4  28  54 
  0  25%  60 43 51  50  48 
  0  50%  223 157 188  102  40 
  0  75%  492 343 395  190  30 
I
2=25%  0  100%  876 604 605  314  15 
 1  0%  7 6 6  28  55 
 1  25%  10 7 7  27  55 
  1  50%  22 10 12  26  70 
  1  75%  44 18 21  25  96 
  1  100%  72 27 30  24  137 
  0  0%  12 11 10  54  104 
  0  25%  83 60 73  79  91 
  0  50%  299 211 263  144  80 
  0  75%  662 467 562  265  69 
I
2=58%  0 100%  1168  831  846  456  63 
  1  0%  11 11 10  55  103 
  1  25%  20 14 16  51  100 
  1  50%  46 26 34  48  98 
  1  75%  91 47 61  47  107 
 1  100%  155  74  96  47  129 
  0  0%  32 29 28  131  234 
  0  25%  160 107 142  168  211 
  0  50%  543 354 483  274  184 
 0  75%  1195  797  1047  479  177 
I
2=85%  0  100%  2104 1444 1678 829  209 
  1  0%  31 28 27  132  238 
  1  25%  61 43 52  123  210 
 1  50%  179  91  129  118  179 
  1  75%  316 173 255  123  156 
  1  100%  542 282 414  123  149 





2). FEE & REE denote the fixed-effects and random-
effects estimators, respectively.   is estimated from equation 2.  e β ˆ
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Thus, we have demonstrated the genuine possibility that discarding 90% of the 
data can improve our scientific knowledge.  Although it is impossible to know the 
true prevalence of publication selection in the empirical sciences, we suspect that 
many specific areas of research will have the majority of their results subject to 
publication selection.  Among clinical medical trials, “trials with positive findings . 
. . had nearly four times the odds of being published compared to findings that were 
not statistically significant” (Hopewell et al., 2009, Summary).  In two-thirds of the 
areas of economics research, we find either ‘substantial’ or ‘severe’ publication 
selection (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2008).  Such high levels of selection, as 
measured by the estimate of βSE from equation (2), are likely to correspond to an 
incidence of selection of 50% or greater (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2008, 
Appendix Table 1). 
Thus far, we have compared the Top10 to simple and weighted averages of 
reported effects. But none of these alternative estimators are specifically designed 
to correct for publication bias.  It remains to be seen how the Top10 performs 
relative to meta-analytic methods designed to reduce publication bias.  Economists 
and medical researchers use estimates of the MRA coefficient, βe, from equation (2) 
to correct for publication bias (Sutton et al., 2000; Stanley, 2008; Moreno et al., 
2009).  A ‘comprehensive simulation study’ by medical researchers concludes that: 
“Several of the regression based methods consistently outperformed the Trim & Fill 
estimators” (Moreno et al., 2009, Results). Of these regression-based corrections of 
publication bias, the coefficient on precision in MRA equation (2), βe, has been 
used most often.  The last column of Tables 1-4 report means and MSE of the 
estimates of this MRA coefficient on precision, .  Whenever there is a genuine 
empirical effect, Top10 has a lower MSE than does .  However, when there is no 
genuine underlying empirical effect, this relative performance mostly reverses (see 
Tables 1-4). In over half of these cases (39 out of 60), Top10 has a lower MSE than 
a MRA estimator that is designed to reduce publication bias and uses all of the 
reported results.   
e β ˆ
e β ˆ
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The practical utility of employing the Top10 is considerably greater that this 
direct comparison to   would seem to indicate. We only need a corrected estimate 
of the overall empirical effect when we have reason to believe that there is, in fact, 
some nonzero empirical effect.  As these simulations show, Top10 will be less 
biased than  in the majority of these cases.  Previous simulations have 
demonstrated that testing H
e β ˆ
e β ˆ
0:  βe=0 (i.e., precision-effect test) often serves as a 
powerful and valid test of the presence of a genuine empirical effect beyond 
publication selection (Stanley, 2008). Thus, in most of those cases where we reject 
H0: βe=0, Top10 will be less biased. In the absence of evidence of an authentic 
effect (i.e., the failure to reject H0: βe =0), all estimators will be biased, and we are 
better off assuming that βe is zero (Stanley, 2008).   
Lastly, Table 5 reports coverage probabilities, which measure the proportion of 
the simulations (replications=10,000) where the true effect falls with the calculated 
95% confidence interval. In addition to Top10 and , the random-effects estimator 
(REE) is included.  When there is excess random heterogeneity, as is the case for all 
of these simulations, REE (rather that FEE or the simple mean) is the valid 
summary statistic.  Therefore, REE is likely to possess better coverage properties 
than either the simple average or FEE.  As before, when there is a genuine empirical 
effect,  Top10 performs the best.  In this critical situation, Top10 has excellent 
coverage probabilities even in the presence of dominating publication selection. 
However, in these same cases, the coverage for both    and REE is often 
unacceptably low.   
e β ˆ
e β ˆ
When there is no true empirical effect, the tables are turned, and Top10 has 
unacceptably low coverage probabilities in most cases.  Even here, Top10 
consistently performs better than the random-effects estimator (REE).  In the 
majority of all the cases simulated, Top10’s coverage is closer to the nominal level 
(95%) than is .  Nonetheless, Top10’s low coverage probabilities in some cases 
would constitute a serious cause of concern if Top10 were to be used as a corrected 
estimate of overall effect when there is no actual underlying empirical effect.  But a 
e β ˆ
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corrected estimate is only needed when we have evidence that indicates the 
existence of a true empirical effect (reject H0: βe=0). 
 
Table 5: Coverage of Alternative Research Summary Estimators (n=80) 
Hetero- 
geneity* 
True effect  Selection 
Incidence 
REE  Top10 
e β ˆ  
  0  0%  .950 .949 .936 
  0  25%  .038 .879 .984 
 0  50%  0  .582  .988 
 0  75%  0  .179  .985 
I
2=25%  0 100%  0  0  .815 
  1  0%  .947 .955 .939 
  1  25%  .863 .954 .907 
  1  50%  .580 .949 .811 
  1  75%  .221 .953 .607 
  1  100%  .042 .944 .307 
  0  0%  .954 .951 .934 
  0  25%  .081 .900 .971 
 0  50%  0  .676  .969 
 0  75%  0  .276  .941 
I
2=58%  0 100%  0  0  .489 
  1  0%  .950 .948 .928 
  1  25%  .793 .950 .929 
  1  50%  .322 .949 .886 
  1  75%  .024 .941 .791 
 1  100%  0  .934  .590 
  0  0%  .952 .939 .932 
  0  25%  .170 .909 .959 
 0  50%  0  .732  .957 
 0  75%  0  .367  .895 
I
2=85%  0 100%  0  0  .333 
  1  0%  .937 .954 .933 
  1  25%  .673 .952 .940 
  1  50%  .099 .936 .936 
 1  75%  0  .915  .902 
 1  100%  0  .891  .790 





2). FEE & REE denote the fixed-effects and random-
effects estimators, respectively.   is estimated from equation 2.  e β ˆ
 
Ignoring publication selection can result in large biases and in the 
misidentification of empirical effects that do not actually exist.  Such biases can 
lead to inappropriate policy decisions even when based on all applicable research.  
Yet doing something as simple as calculating the average of the most precise 10% 
of the reported estimates can greatly reduce this bias and improve policy.  If nothing 
else, policy makers and practitioners could use the difference between the Top10 
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and the simple average as an indicator of the presence of publication biases.  When 
this difference is of a practically important magnitude, the Top10 or a more 
sophisticated publication bias correction technique should be employed.  There are 
other, more sophisticated, meta-regression methods that will outperform both Top10 
and   in some cases, but no single method is dominant (Moreno et al., 2009; 
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007). 
e β ˆ
 
4. What’s the Difference? Policy Implications of Publication Selection 
 
The difference between these estimates often has practical consequences.  In 
2007, the US Congress raised the minimum wage, starting July 24
th 2007, by $.70 
per year for three years, until it reaches a value of $7.25/hour in 2009.  Each time 
that new minimum-wage legislation is brought before the US Congress, opposition 
cites economics research and the consensus among economists that raising the 
minimum wage will cause a decrease in employment (or an increase in 
unemployment).  Economists’ reasoning is very simple and based on supply and 
demand.  Essentially, if you raise the cost of hiring (and keeping) workers, 
businesses will be able to afford fewer of them.  A discussion of the adverse 
employment effects of raising the minimum wage is contained in virtually every 
introductory economics textbook.  
In spite of 678 reported statistically significant estimates of minimum-wage’s 
adverse employment effect, a more comprehensive analysis of the reported research 
finds “no evidence of a meaningful adverse employment effect when selection 
effects are filtered from the research record” (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009, pp. 
422-23).  For example, the Top10 estimate of this minimum-wage effect is -0.0217 
(implying that a doubling of the minimum wage will lead to a 2% decrease in 
teenage employment).  When a multivariate meta-regression approach is used that 
explicitly models both publication selection and the underlying empirical effect, 
adverse employment effects are converted to a positive and significant employment 
effect (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).  There are theoretical reasons for this 
positive effect on employment.  For example, workers might become more loyal 
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and more productive when they are paid well, the ‘efficiency-wage hypothesis.’  
Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a positive effect of wage raises 
among tests of the efficiency–wage hypothesis after correcting for publication 
selection (Krassoi Peach and Stanley, 2009).  The point is that a closer examination 
of the 1,474 reported estimates of minimum-wage employment effects provides 
little justification for meaningful adverse minimum wage effect.  The simple Top10 
reduces the minimum-wage effect to practically zero.    
Likewise, the Top10 greatly reduces the practical consequences of the adoption 
of a common currency.  Recall that the average reported common currency effect is 
0.859 (or 136%). If their trade with the EU were really to increase by 136%, the UK 
and Denmark (for example) would find it extremely difficult to continue to resist 
the pull of the EMU (European Monetary Union) and the Euro.  Such a large 
economic benefit might easily be sufficient to persuade policy makers in the UK 
and Denmark to forgo much of their economic policy independence.  In contrast, 
the Top10 estimates the trade effect attributable to joining a currency union to be 
only 10%.  This smaller economic benefit of currency union may be seen by some 
policy makers as inadequate compensation for the accompanying reduction of 
national economic sovereignty.  Worse still, testing H0:  βe=0 in equation (2) 
provides evidence of a negative trade effect (t=-4.36; p<.01) after correcting for 
publication selection. Recall that the above simulations show that that the Top10 is 
biased upwards, when there is no underlying empirical effect.  Some upward or 
positive bias could remain even if the true empirical effect were slightly negative.  
Correcting for publication selection with even this simple and naïve estimator can 
have important policy consequences.     
Lastly, correcting for publication selection also has a large practical effect on 
the efficacy of using a nicotine replacement patch for smoking cessation (recall 
Section 2.2).  As discussed above, the unadjusted average risk ratio is 1.93 and is 
only marginally statistically significant when allowance is made for publication 
selection.  The Top 10 reduces this risk ratio to 1.53, which nearly halves the 
improved likelihood of quitting smoking.  Although nicotine replacement therapy 
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still shows some efficacy, its advantage over alternative approaches becomes much 
less clear.   
 
5. Conclusions 
   
Could it be better to discard 90% of the reported research?  Surprisingly, the 
answer is yes to this statistical paradox.  This paper has shown how publication 
selection can greatly distort the research record and its conventional summary 
statistics.  Using both Monte Carlo simulations and actual research examples, we 
show how a simple estimator, which uses only 10 percent of the reported research 
reduces publication bias and improves efficiency over conventional summary 
statistics that use all the reported research.  
The average of the most precise 10 percent, ‘Top10,’ of the reported estimates 
of a given empirical phenomenon is often better than conventional summary 
estimators because of its heavy reliance on the reported estimate’s precision (i.e., 
the inverse of the estimate’s standard error).  When estimates are chosen, in part, for 
their statistical significance, studies cursed with imprecise estimates have to engage 
in more intense selection from among alternative statistical techniques, models, data 
sets, and measures to produce the larger estimate that statistical significance 
demands.  Thus, imprecise estimates will contain larger biases.   
Studies that have access to more data will tend to be more precise, and hence 
less biased.   At the level of the original empirical research, the statistician’s motto, 
“the more data the better,” holds because more data typically produce more precise 
estimates.  It is only at the meta-level of integrating, summarizing, and interpreting 
an entire area of empirical research (meta-analysis), where the removal of 90% of 
the data might actually improve our empirical knowledge.  Even when the authors 
of these larger and more precise studies actively select for statistical significance in 
the desired direction, smaller significant estimates will tend to be reported.   Thus, 
precise studies will, on average, be less biased and thereby possess greater scientific 
quality, ceteris paribus.   
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We hope that the statistical paradox identified in this paper refocuses the 
empirical sciences upon precision.  Precision should be universally adopted as one 
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Figure 1. Funnel Plot of Union-Productivity Partial Correlations. A funnel 
plot is a scatter diagram of precision, the inverse of an estimate’s standard 


























Figure 2: Funnel Graph of the Log Risk Ratio of Nicotine Replacement Therapy 
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Figure 3: Trimmed Funnel Graph of Estimated Minimum-Wage Effects (n=1,424). 
Source: Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009). A few (50 or 3.4%) of the most extreme 
wage elasticities have been trimmed to reveal how the majority of this research is 
distributed.  If the data were not trimmed, the graph would appear as a large spike 
in the middle with a handful of points on the extreme ‘wings.’ 
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Figure 4. Trimmed Funnel Graph of Common Currency–Trade Effect. 
Source: Rose and Stanley (2005). A few (5%) extreme negative estimates as 
well as a few (5%) positive values have been trimmed in order to see the 
shape of the vast majority of these estimates of the trade effect.  
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